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DEBTOR'S PRISON IN THE NEOLIBERAL STATE:
"DEBTFARE" AND THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
LINDA COCO*
ABSTRACT
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") of 2005, amending the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, marks a transformation in
bankruptcy law and policy that is representative of larger shifts in
dominant economic and political models from "embedded liberalism"
to free market "neoliberalism." BAPCPA's provisions are part of the
new practices of the emergent neoliberal state as they relate to the
American middle class segment of the population. In disciplining the
middle class, BAPCPA shifts the risk and the responsibility of the
lending relationship onto consumer debtors. BAPCPA does this by
keeping financially distressed individuals servicing debt obligations
both inside and outside the bankruptcy system. Socio-cultural theory
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1
1
Coco: Debtor's Prison in the Neoliberal State: "Debtfare" and the Cultu
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2012
2 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
provides a broadened frame for understanding the economic shift
reflected in this fundamental transformation in legal mandates.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................... 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................... 2
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFECTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005..........3
II. NEOLIBERALISM: A SET OF GLOBAL POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC PRACTICES ADOPTED LOCALLY ..... ........... 12
A. America's Middle Income Families and the Market
Conditions Creating the Possibility of "Debtfare" ........ 20
B. Debt Trap and BAPCPA ........ ............... 27
III. BARRIERS, TRAP DOORS, AND PAYMENT PLANS:
BANKRUPTCY REFORM REINFORCES "DEBTFARE"...............28
A. Stigma: Re-Imposing a Cultural "KEEP OUT" Sign.........29
B. Barriers to Entry: Fees and Counseling........................32
C. Repeat Filing and BAPCPA's Trap Doors . ........... 35
D. Increased Scrutiny and Requirements for the Bankruptcy
Debtor Once in Bankruptcy Process.......... ..... 37
E. Reduction of Protection and Benefit in Bankruptcy Process40
IV. DOMINANT CULTURAL DISCOURSE OF MORAL
BEHAVIORALISM: STIGMATIZED FISCAL IDENTITIES AND
COLLECTIVE AMNESIA .......................... ....... 45
VI. CONCLUSION-TIGHTENING THE BELTS OF THE POOR AS
THE BELTS OF THE RICH ARE LOOSENED. . .................. 47
"Surely one has to pay one's debts."]
1. See DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 4 (2011). Debt
relations capture what French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieus would describe as his
notion of the doxa found in debt relations in the U.S. Doxa is the manner in which
"every established order tends to produce . . . the naturalization of its own
arbitrariness." PIERRE BOuRDIEu, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164
(Cambridge Univ. Press). Doxa is the experience and social process through which
"the natural and social world appear self-evident. This experience we call doxa, so
as to distinguish it from an orthodoxy or heterodoxy, belief systems implying
awareness." Id. In the U.S., Enlightenment notions of individualism strongly inform
the dominant discourses surrounding debt relationships. Id. Risk and responsibility
are assigned according to shifting collective beliefs concerning individualism and
2
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFECTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
In 2005, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA" or "Act") 2 with the primary
purpose of responding to a continuing "upward trend" in consumer
bankruptcy filings.3  The House of Representatives report on
BAPCPA ("Report") characterized the reason for this upward trend as
a "lack of personal financial accountability," leading to an abuse of
the system because debtors' petitions are "bankruptcy filings of
convenience."4 The Report adopted the view that filing a consumer
bankruptcy petition is a moral rather than an economic act.6 Building
on dominant cultural discourses of individualism and moral
personal responsibility. Id. Changes in collectively held notions are traceable to
larger social forces such as class. Id.
2. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 U.S.C.). Most provisions of the Act became effective Oct. 17, 2005. Id.
3. H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1, at 2-4 (2005). (Judiciary Comm.). To Accompany S.
256. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.
4. Id. at 2. BAPCPA's purpose was to "improve bankruptcy law and policy by
restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure
that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors." Although appearing to have
concern for debtors, BAPCPA actually works to the major disadvantage of the
debtor. It in effect eviscerates the consumer relief goals of the 1978 Code.
Conversely, the purpose of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, was to address "the
inadequacy of relief that the Bankruptcy Act provides for consumer debtors... This
bill makes bankruptcy a more effective remedy for the unfortunate consumer
debtor." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
5973 and 6082. The 2005 BAPCPA amendments "clearly represent a shift in the
policy choices of Congress in the category of seismic or cataclysmic." Margaret
Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U.L.J. 451 (2007).
5. There are two types of bankruptcy petition filers: consumer and entity.
6. A bankruptcy petition filing by an entity such as a corporation or institution
remains a purely economic act; it is a business decision. See Bob Adelmann, Donald
Trump: The Art of Bankruptcy, THE NEW AMERICAN, (April 11, 2011, 5:59 PM),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/politics/item/5764-donald-trump-the-art-
of-bankruptcy. Four time bankruptcy filer Donald Trump told George
Stephanopoulos: "I've used the laws of this country to pare debt.... We'll have the
company [that's in financial trouble].. .we'll throw it into a chapter [11 bankruptcy].
We'll negotiate with the banks. We'll make a fantastic deal. You know, it's like
on The Apprentice: It's not personal. It's just business."
32012]
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behavioralism, the Report asserts: "[s]hoplifting is wrong; bankruptcy
is also a moral act [in that] .. ..There is a conscious decision not to
keeps one's promises."7 The stated goal of the Act, then, is to restore
"personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system."8
In furtherance of this goal, BAPCPA has several provisions
intended to limit and regulate the consumer debtor's access to
bankruptcy relief,9 the most important of which is the "means test." 0
The means test is intended to divert and force high-income "can pay"
individual debtors from chapter 7 dissolution (granting debtors a total
discharge of all debt)" into chapter 13 repayment (granting debtors a
discharge only after completion of all payments under the plan).12
The primary purpose of the new law is to prevent a chapter 7 filing by
debtors with income above the median, instead forcing them to repay
their creditors through a chapter 13 plan. The Consumer Bankruptcy
Project data show that the majority of consumer bankruptcy filers
have a family income well below the means test threshold of between
$20,000 and $30,000.'1 In light of its stated purpose, BAPCPA
appears to be "an exquisite example of law unhinged from reality"' 4
because Congress crafted the Act based on an utterly misinformed
premise about who files bankruptcy.' 5 Therefore, BAPCPA is failing
7. H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1, at 3 (2005).
8. Id. at 2.
9. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010) (discussing eligibility provisions for
chapter 7); see also 11.U.S.C. § 109(h) (2010) (discussing mandatory pre-
bankruptcy credit counseling); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)&(4) (2010)
(discussing dismissal provisions for repeat filers).
10. I U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2010).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2010) (granting debtors a total discharge of all debts).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2010) (granting debtors a discharge only after
completion of all payments under the plan).
13. Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A.E.
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 358 (2008).
14. Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16
Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349,353 (2008).
15. A comprehensive profile of the consumer debtor is found in data collected
from consumer petitions filed in 1981,1991, 2001, and 2007 by the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 49-62 (1989); see also
Lawless, supra note 13, at 352-54; see also KATHERINE M. PORTER, BROKE: How
4 [Vol. 49
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miserably at accomplishing its stated purposes.' 6 Instead, BAPCPA is
triggering unintended effects and consequences.' 7
One consequence of BAPCPA is the drastic reduction in the
number of consumer bankruptcy filings.' 8 At the end of 2007, a year
before the mortgage crisis, bankruptcy filings were 20% to 40% lower
than they would have been without BAPCPA.' 9 In the following
years, consumer filings have remained significantly lower than the
expected number of filings even though numbers of total filings are
reaching pre-BAPCPA levels.2 0 Since the enactment of BAPCPA, a
financial meltdown occurred in the U.S. economy. Based on such
circumstances, one would expect the rate of bankruptcy filings to
increase significantly, and yet, the rate increased only moderately. 21
Although this reduction could be explained by high-income debtors
taking responsibility to pay their debts, legal scholars reject this
argument, because "studies estimated that only three to eleven percent
of chapter 7 cases involved such debtors, prior to BAPCPA."22
DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS (2012) 1-24; see also Braucher, supra note
14, at 352-353.
16. Lawless, supra note 13, at 358; Braucher, supra note 14, at 349; Howard,
supra note 5, at 451.
17. Howard, supra note 4, at 452 ("Sociologist Robert Merton identified
factors that lead to unintended consequences. Several of the factors are particularly
relevant in the bankruptcy context, namely, ignorance, error, and ... the 'imperious
immediacy of interest."').
18. Id. at 458.
19. Christian E. Weller, Bernard J. Morzuch & Amanda Logan, Estimating the
Effect of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on
the Bankruptcy Rate, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 328 (2010).
20. Lawless supra note 13, at 349-51. ("If bankruptcy filings had continued at
the same level as they had been immediately before enactment of BAPCPA, about
1.6 million petitions would have been filed in 2007-about twice as many as the
827,000 bankruptcies that actually occurred. The sharp reduction in filings after the
amendments represents about 800,000 families that would have filed but did not.").
21. U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT STATISTICS (2008-2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/bankruptcystatistics.aspx (In 2008, there were
694, 855 Chapter 7 filings, 356,352 Chapter 13 filings, and 851 Chapter 11 filings.
In 2009, there were 984,125 Chapter 7 filings, 399,519 Chapter 13 filings and 1,476
Chapter 11 filings. In 2010, there were 1,071,769 Chapter 7 filings, 430,900 Chapter
13 filings and 1,900 Chapter 11 filings.).
22. David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of
2012] 5
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Before the passage of BAPCPA, bankruptcy scholars emphasized
this possible effect of the proposed legislative reforms and predicted
that the new law would make "access to bankruptcy more difficult for
all."23  BAPCPA's complex and burdensome provisions create
financial and procedural barriers which prevent consumer debtors
from receiving a fresh start, as intended by the 1978 Code.24 The
2005 Act forecloses families from considering bankruptcy as a real
option for relieving financial distress. 25 The Consumer Bankruptcy
Project reports that BAPCPA functions "like a barricade, blocking out
hundreds of thousands of struggling families indiscriminately,
regardless of their individual income circumstances."26 It appears to
have the insidious result of destroying the effectiveness of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code.
The effects of BAPCPA are often described as "unintended
consequences," but perhaps, as legal scholar Margaret Howard
suggests, there are "no unintended consequences here." 27  These
changes do not appear accidental. The 1978 Code was criticized as
"too liberal," 28 because it helped millions of middle class families29
2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INSTI. L. REv. 223, 319 (2007).
23. Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of
Means, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 408-13 (2002) (predicting that the new
legislation would fail in executing on its stated purpose and that it "would make
access to bankruptcy more difficult for all, imposing new costs and hurdles and thus
pricing the worst off out of the system." She further explained: "The predictable
effect of making bankruptcy more complicated and expensive would be to deny
relief to those with little ability to repay. Debt collectors would be able to squeeze a
little more... from debtors denied the protection of the bankruptcy system.").
24. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 4 (1977).
25. Lois R. LUPICA, AM. BANKR. INST AN NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BANKR.
JUDGES, THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY FEE STUDY: FINAL REPORT 112 (2011)
[hereinafter The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study] (identifying this phenomena as
"BAPCPA's unintended effects" which have turned a system meant to assist the
"poor, but unfortunate debtors" on its head. The study details the numerous ways in
which BAPCPA neither creates uniformity nor generates a fair result for the
participants. Judges state that the law was not "in the best interest of the system as a
whole").
26. Lawless, supra note 13, at 353.
27. Howard, supra note 4, at 458.
28. Interview by Bradley Williams with Bankruptcy Judge Joe Lee in
Lexington, Kentucky (Oct. 19-20, 2005). National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges, Oral History Collection 1993-2004, Nat'l Bankruptcy Archives at Biddle
6 [Vol. 49
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obtain a fresh start. BAPCPA does what Elizabeth Warren cautioned
in 1997: BAPCPA introduced proposed amendments to the 1978 Code
that did not strengthen the consumer bankruptcy system, but rather,
destroyed it.3 o BAPCPA has not only destroyed key consumer
oriented aspects of the 1978 Code, but it has also created neoliberal
mechanisms for reallocating the risks and responsibilities of the
lending relationship onto the shoulders of borrowers.
Bankruptcy professionals refer to BAPCPA as the "leave no
creditor behind"3 ' law because in its poor drafting, confusion, and
inconsistency,32 it manages to shift the risk and responsibility of the
lending relationship onto consumer debtors by keeping financially
Law Library, Univ. of Pa., School of Law, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives /bankruptcy/digicoll/oralhistories.html.
29. See Katherine Porter, Driven by Debt: Bankruptcy and Financial Failure
in American Families, in BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 10
(Katherine Porter, ed., 2012) (". . . [M]ore than 90[%] of bankrupt people are
members of the middle class."); see also Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A
Vulnerable Middle Class: Bankruptcy and Class Status, in BROKE: How DEBT
BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 28 (Katherine Porter, ed., 2012) (providing a
definition of the middle class using income indicators, status markers, lifestyle
choices, assets, and values. They also explain using the work of sociologist Martin
Marger that there are "three levels of middle class-upper-middle, lower-middle,
and working class-and when all three are combined, 68 to 80[%] of Americans are
situated, broadly speaking, in the middle class"); see also, OFFICE OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK
FORCE ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 10 (2010) [hereinafter The White House's Middle
Class Task Force] (defining "middle class" both socially and economically as
"working families" whose annual income ranges from $55,000 to $123,000, and
who aspire to home ownership, a car, college education for their children, health
insurance, retirement security and occasional family vacations), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/strongmiddleclass/reports.
30. Elizabeth Warren, Reforming Bankruptcy Law: Four Proposals: A
Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 Am. BANKR. L. J. 483, 506
(1997).
31. New Bankruptcy Law, WHITE & CASE (Oct. 17, 2005)
http://www.whitecase.com/news/detail.aspx?news=49.
32. Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005
Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 93, 97-98
(2007); see also Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The
Need for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2006)
(explaining that BAPCPA is also identified by bankruptcy professionals as the
BARF Act, "Bankruptcy ReForm Act or Bankruptcy Abuse Reduction Fiasco,
because Congress was inconsistent in drafting various provisions in the new Act).
2012] 7
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distressed individuals servicing debt obligations both inside and
outside the bankruptcy system. Debtors are forced to continue to
either pay high interest rate payments outside bankruptcy or allocate
all of their disposable income to their debts through bankruptcy.
Thus, BAPCPA benefits issuers of credit cards, car lenders, and
mortgage holders in both instances.
BAPCPA benefits creditors by putting up barriers to entry (e.g.,
increased court costs and attorney fees) and creating pitfalls (e.g.,
credit counseling requirements and new eligibility standards) resulting
in dismissals of bankruptcy cases. In effect, the needy individual is
precluded from using the bankruptcy system. This increases the
individual's overall debt load because in the time the individual is
prevented from filing, high monthly interest continues to accrue.33
This process is known as the "sweat box."34 Inside the bankruptcy
system, BAPCPA makes filing and staying in chapter 7 more difficult
for debtors, benefitting creditors through increased debt servitude.35
The new law forces debtors into repayment plans,36  limits
dischargeable debts,37 prevents bifurcation of debt into secured and
33. Weller, supra note 20, at 347 (explaining that post-BAPCPA, debtors
"may have faced the same economic reasons for bankruptcy but delayed filing due
to the higher costs and lower benefits of bankruptcy after BAPCPA. They may have
financed this delay by borrowing more money on their credit cards.").
34. Ronald J. Mann, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005
Act: Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REv. 375, 375-76 (2007) (arguing that the new Act, rather than achieving its stated
purpose of catching can pay debtors, actually works to benefit issuers of revolving
credit loans with high interest rates by keeping individuals in need outside the
bankruptcy system, the sweat box. He further argues that the means test alone would
not give the credit industry enough return in the form of bankruptcy chapter 13 plan
payouts to justify the lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions that led to
the Act's passage. Rather, the most significant effect of the new Act is to slow the
time of inevitable bankruptcy petition filing by consumers. This allows for the
issuers to gain increased pre-bankruptcy high interest rate credit card payments for
longer than under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Mann argues that the Act does limited
good for the credit card issuers once the consumer debtor files the bankruptcy
petition.).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2010); see also U.S. Bankruptcy Official Form
B22A; see also U.S. Bankruptcy Official Form B22C.
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2010).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2010).
8
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unsecured portions, 38 and requires reaffirmation agreements.39 Thus,
BAPCPA represents a fundamental shift in legal and policy structures
of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
Although entitled the "Consumer Protection Act," BAPCPA does
not protect consumers at all. In fact, the incongruously named Act is
antagonistic to the purpose of the 1978 Code. The purpose of which
was to make "bankruptcy a more effective remedy for the unfortunate
consumer debtor" faced with "the tremendous rise" in the consumer
credit market and consequent "outstanding consumer" debt.40
Contrasted with the 1978 Code, BAPCPA's purpose and structure
eliminate the presumption in favor of granting debtors a discharge and
replace it with a mandatory presumption of abuse that debtors must
initially overcome. 4 1 Under the guise of preventing abuse, BAPCPA
imposes a litany of confusing procedures and requirements on
consumer debtors and their counsel, contravening the purpose of the
1978 Code, which was to provide debtors with a clean slate and a
fresh start. BAPCPA destroys a "safety valve [for society] to deal
with financial consequences of misfortunes," 42 and it undermines "one
of the few areas of consumer law that work[ed] reasonably well to
meet consumer needs."4 3 BAPCPA frustrates the operation of the
1978 Code, because it manifests fundamental changes in the class and
power structures of the U.S. economy. The wide-angle lens of
anthropological theory reveals these social and economic structural
shifts.
The context of American society44 and culture45 provides a
broadened frame for understanding the economic shift reflected in the
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2010).
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(k) (2010).
40. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 5966 (1977).
41. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, 13 (2005).
42. Warren, supra note 30, at 492.
43. Braucher, supra note 14, at 413.
44. The author uses the terms "society" and "social" to discuss the structures
that arrange human interactions such as institutions, organizations, government
bodies, communities, and all structures of human organization. See FELIX M.
KEESING, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF CUSTOM 30 (1960); ("[p]ut
most simply, 'culture' puts the focus on the customs of a people; 'society' puts it
upon the people who are practicing the customs.").
45. The author employs the terms "culture" and "cultural" to denote notions,
92012]1
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transformation of bankruptcy law and policy from the time of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to the BAPCPA of 2005. Applying
an anthropological perspective, University of California, Berkeley
professor Laura Nader explains that social and cultural beliefs,
behaviors, and practices constitute law, legal categories, and
processes. 46  Social forces shape the substance of law and most
aspects of legal practice. Legal structures and categories, as British
legal historian E.P. Thompson explains, not only convey information
(semantic meaning), but also express and reflect social divisions and
inequalities. 7 In other words, legal structures and categories have
pragmatic and contextual meanings. To understand the 2005
amendments to the 1978 Code, therefore, one must situate them within
the larger political-economic organizations of American culture and
society.
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978,48 national
and international economic and political49 structures have shifted,
giving rise to the neoliberalso "free market" model. These shifts have
caused deep changes in the social structures of American and
European countries, as well as second and third world countries.
Viewed through an anthropological lens, the new bankruptcy law
creates legal categories and processes that are informed and
constituted through the beliefs, values, behaviors, and practices
emergent from these new economic and political structures.
BAPCPA's legal structures and categories are part of a larger structure
beliefs, values, and other organizing concepts that shape human behavior and
practices. See id.
46. LAURA NADER, LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 1-10 (1969) (disagreeing
with the view that law is separate from social processes, experiences, and meanings
and explaining that anthropologists are trained to place all human created
institutions within the culture from which they emerge).
47. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT
191 (Penguin Books, 1st American ed., 1975) (discussing the social, political and
economic processes that define what is considered a "crime" and "offender.").
48. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 254
(codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501).
49. The author believes, as does Milton Friedman, that "there is an intimate
connection between economics and politics." MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 8 (40th Anniversary ed., Univ. of Chi. Press, 1962) [hereinafter
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM].
50. For a further discussion of neoliberalism, see infra Section II.
10 [Vol. 49
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 49 [2012], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol49/iss1/3
DEBTOR'S PRISON IN THE NEOLIBERAL STATE
manifesting a particular set of political and economic beliefs about
debt and debt relations for the middle class that ultimately replicates
and solidifies social divisions and inequalities.
The recent BAPCPA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code of
1978, when considered through a sociological and anthropological
lens, are part of this neoliberal turn. Free-market policy and the
practice of deregulation facilitated enormous debt loads, resulting in a
socio-economic experience of "debtfare" 5 for the average
American. 5 2  Debtfare is interlocking debt obligations that last for
years, such as mortgage, credit card, car loan, and other monthly
payments. Debtfare is a socially constructed trap. Political scientists
Genevieve LeBaron and Adrienne Roberts explain debtfare as
structures that "lock people's current and future life choices and
possibilities into unequal and unfree capitalist social relations and. . .
limit their social and physical mobility within these relations."53
BAPCPA supports the structures of debtfare by limiting the possibility
of a discharge of debts and by regulating the manner, form, and
amount of debt repaid. By forcing repayment to lenders both inside
and outside the bankruptcy system, BAPCPA mandates a lifestyle of
austerity, for middle class debtors. 54  Thus, the insidious effect of
BAPCPA is the creation of a large group of Americans servicing
burdensome debts without any relief.
Part II of this article considers the international implementation of
the neoliberal economic model and its homologous structures adopted
in the U.S. Most significantly, it discusses the manner in which
neoliberal policies and practices established the conditions possible
for middle class debtfare. Part III details the manner in which
BAPCPA is an extension of those approaches and how BAPCPA
51. Susanne Soederberg, The US Debtfare State and the Credit Card Industry:
Forging Spaces ofDispossession, 45 ANTIPODE 493 (March 2013).
52. Porter, supra note 29, at 4 ("In the mid-i 980s, the ratio of debt to personal
disposable income for American households was 65 percent. During the next two
decades, U.S. household leverage more than doubled, reaching an all time high of
133 percent in 2007. Measured in the aggregate, the ratio of household debt to gross
national product reached its highest level since the onset of the Great Depression.").
53. Genevieve LeBaron & Adrienne Roberts, Toward a Feminist Political
Economy of Capitalism and Carcerality, 36 SIGNS 1, 20 (2010).
54. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 99-101 (2007)
[hereinafter HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM].
112012]
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ensures debtfare. Part IV discusses the dominant cultural discourses
of moral behavioralism and the model of individualism and personal
responsibility as they work to make neoliberalism appear natural,
inevitable, and just.
II. NEOLIBERALISM: A SET OF GLOBAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
PRACTICES ADOPTED LOCALLY-
To understand neoliberalism, it is necessary to consider its
predecessor, embedded liberalism. After World War II, the U.S.
population experienced the realization of the Fordist-Keynesian
economic model," "embedded liberalism."56  This period marked
consistent economic growth for the middle class because this model
ensured wage increases for the average worker and income increases
for executives and investors, along with an increase in the rate of
productivity.57 Prior to the advent of embedded liberalism, the U.S.
economy experienced high rates of economic growth but suffered
from volatile swings in the marketplace that negatively impacted the
economy.58 Embedded liberalism reduced the volatility of the market
and created economic stability.
In the late 1970s, as profits of large corporations began to stagnate
and incomes for investors began to decline, there was a shift in the
economic model.59  In the U.S., the former political-economic
55. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 49, at 22-36. See also MILTON
FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1867-1960, 530-35 (1971).
56. Embedded liberalism is a form of political organization characterized by a
class compromise between capital and labor. It includes fiscal and monetary policies
used to dampen business cycles and to ensure reasonably full employment. The state
intervened in "industrial policy" and moved to set standards for the social wage by
constructing a variety of welfare systems, e.g. healthcare and education. See
HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 10-12.
57. The White House's Middle Class Task Force, supra note 29, at 3
(documenting the status and position of the middle class including the increased gap
between productivity and wages, economic inequality and mobility, shifts in gender
roles, and work-life balance).
58. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 11.
59. WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 51, at 49.
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organization of embedded liberalism began to break down,60 and gave
way to the rise of a new political-economic form identified as the
"neoliberal" or "free market" model.6' This model emerged with the
help of economists62 and political leaders63 who supported neoliberal
theories advanced by powerful policy and education institutions."6
With the support of political leaders and prominent economic
institutions, neoliberal theorists' ideas and notions became globally
dominant.
Neoliberal theory posits that individual freedoms are best
guaranteed by unregulated trade practices.6 ' The cornerstone of a
neoliberal political-economic order is privatization and deregulation.66
Only free market mandates should mediate aspects of economic,
political, and social life. Competition, according to the ground rules
of the free market, between and among individuals and institutions is
the primary means of social and cultural interactions. 67 Capital
accumulation by individual actors is of primary importance and
treasured within the neoliberal marketplace.68  Therefore, the
paramount feature of governing rests upon the notion that state
apparatuses exist to protect and favor individual private property. In
theory, the goal of the emerging neoliberal state is to facilitate the
appropriate conditions for competition and capital accumulation.69
Attempting to ensure increases in corporate profit and investor
income, many governments employed neoliberal economic models,
60. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 12.
61. DAVID HARVEY, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM 1-10 (2010) [hereinafter
HARVEY, CRISIS].
62. Neoliberalism's theoretical origins are traced to a group of economists
known as the "Chicago boys." See HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 8 &
20. The group includes: Milton Friedman, Alfred Marshall, William Stanley Jevons,
and Leon Walras. See id.
63. Including Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Deng Xiaoping, Bill
Clinton, and Tony Blair. See generally HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at
1-38.
64. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 8.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 64-65.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 7.
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engaging in projects to reduce corporate costs and increase corporate
markets in the 1980s. 70  The United States and many European
governments facilitated the export of capital to cultivate new markets
around the world and engaged in deregulation and reregulation, in an
effort to (re)establish favorable conditions for capital accumulation by
a class of economic elites (and to restore the power of that group).'
First, in an attempt to cut costs, political leaders supported
policies that diminished the power of labor and destroyed collective
rights. Collective rights and structures standing in the way of market
logic include social protections, worker protections, unions,
associations, and cooperatives. 72  Free market mandates require a
dereliction of labor law and a deregulation of employment. Second,
political leaders supported the expansion of capital and markets into
the new economies across the globe. Most notably, New York
investment banks lent money to developing Latin American and
African countries. 74 This lending ultimately resulted in the debt crisis
of the 1980s, and the threat of bankruptcy by Mexico in 1982.75 The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) mandated austerity onto debtor
nations to repay the banks.7 The Mexican Debt Crisis of 1982 was
the most pronounced manifestation of the neoliberal economic model.
The "Washington Consensus," formulated by economist John
Williamson to address the Latin American free market creation and
debt structures, led to the global spread of the neoliberal turn.1 It
70. Loic J. D. Wacquant, Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology ofActually
Existing Neoliberalism, 9 Soc. ANTHROPOLOGY 1-14 (2011) [hereinafter Wacquant,
Three Steps].
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Susanne Soederberg, Cannibalistic Capitalism: The Paradoxes of
Neoliberal Pension Securitization, 226 SOCIALIST REG. 225-26 (2011).
74. DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM
10-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010) [hereinafter HARVEY, ENIGMA].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. John Williamson, Peterson Inst. For Int'l Econ., Outline of Speech at the
Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies: Did the Washington Consensus Fail? (Nov, 6,
2002), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?
researchid=488; see also Ravi Kanbur, The Co-Evolution of the Washington
Consensus and the Economic Development Discourse (Cornell Univ. Dept. of
Applied Econ. Working Paper No. 09-05, 2009), available at
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included reforms such as fiscal discipline, reordering public
expenditure priorities, tax reform, competitive exchange rates, and the
liberalization of interest rates, trade, inward foreign investment,
privatization, deregulation, and private property rights. 8 In practice,
neoliberalism resulted in capital accumulation by dispossession.
Wherever one looks across the globe, neoliberal policies in
practice have resulted in
sharp increases in inequality within rapidly growing countries over
the past twenty years. Whether it is China, India, Bangladesh,
Vietnam, Russia, Ghana, South Africa, [or] Mexico ... rapid
growth seems to be accompanied by rising inequality. This has
been matched by rising inequality within the [Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development or "OECD"80
countries].
Globally, neoliberalism (re)establishes favorable conditions for capital
accumulation by a class of economic elites, restoring the power of that
group.82 In other words, it reasserts a rigid class structure.83 This shift
needs to be understood socially as well as economically.
http://dyson.comell.edu/research/researchpdf/wp/2009/ComellDyson.wp0905.pdf.
78. Kanbur, supra note 77.
79. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 160-65 (explaining that on a
global scale the Neoliberal project is a project of wealth redistribution from the pre-
industrialized nations to the industrialized nations. Harvey describes this process as
"capital accumulation by dispossession" and it comprises four features:
privatization and commodification, financialization, management and manipulation
of crisis through the debt trap, and state redistributions. In the United States, the
feature most relevant to the middle class is the management and manipulation of
crisis through the debt trap. Middle class Americans are finding themselves in
deeper and deeper with less assets and security than ever. In the recent mortgage
crisis, many were forced to walk away from over secured homes leaving their
original investment.).
80. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
countries include most first world countries. See OECD Members and Partners,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
81. Kanbur, supra note 77, at 10.
82. Wacquant, Three Steps, supra note 70, at 1-14.
83. The White House's Middle Class Task Force, supra note 29 at 5 ("Figure 3
shows the share of total income ... going to the top one percent of households over
a span of more than 90 years. In the most recent year of available data-2007-over
23 percent of income was held by the top 1 percent, the highest level of income
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In his work, University of California, Berkeley sociologist Loic
Wacquant expands the understanding of the impacts of the neoliberal
economic model in the social world. He argues that we must develop
"our conception of [neoliberalism], and move from an economic to a
fully sociological understanding of the phenomenon." 84 He explains
that what is "neo" about neoliberalism is the remaking and
redeploying of the state as the core agency that actively "fabricates
subjectivities, social relations and collective representations suited to
make the fiction of markets real and consequential." In sociological
and anthropological terms, the liberalization and privatization of the
last three decades have meant something very different for the lower
and middle classes in the U.S. (and across the globe) than for the
upper class.
The neoliberal state "displays opposite visages at the two ends of
the class structure."a On one hand, neoliberal state institutions are
liberating and uplifting for the upper classes in that these institutions
act to "leverage the resources and expand the life options of holders of
economic and cultural capital."87 On the other hand, those at the
opposite end of the class continuum have experienced liberalization
very differently and distinctly.
For the middle and lower classes, the neoliberal turn 8 has meant
job insecurity,89 lack of unemployment benefits,90 wage stagnation
concentration since 1928, the year before the market crash that began the Great
Depression.").
84. Loic J. D. Wacquant, Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare,
Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity, 25(2) Soc. F. 197, 212 (2010) [hereinafter
Wacquant, Crafting].
85. Wacquant, Three Steps, supra note 70, at 1.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id.
88. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 9.
89. In 2011, the unemployment rate in the U.S. hovered around 8.9% or about
13 million Americans out of work. See Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, http://www.bls.gov/cps/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2012).
90. Unemployment benefits are disappearing: in 1975 the duration of benefits
was 15 months, and in 2004 the duration is 6 months. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND DEBT IN AMERICA at 18-
21, available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/research-
analysis/DEMOS-101205.pdf [hereinafter The Plastic Safety Net] (reporting on
findings from surveys of over 41 million people in 15 million households in the
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and decline," decrease of social mobility,92 work week extension,93
lack of healthcare,94 pension uncertainty, 95 social security decline,96
environmental degradation, 9 7 and privatization of resources.98  This
change has been identified as the "great risk shift."99 Over the past
generation, "[e]conomic risk has been increasingly shifted from the
broad shoulders of government and corporations onto the backs of
American workers and their families." 00 While large investment
banking institutions are dubbed "too big to fail,"' 0' middle class
Americans are failing at ever increasing rates. 0 2  Every risk and
responsibility in the process of disintegration of the social contract is
attributed to them.
The most significant aspect of the neoliberal turn for the middle
class is income inequality and wage stagnation, combined with a
U.S.).
91. Campbell, supra note 51, at 65.
92. Middle of the Class, ECONOMIST (July 14, 2005) available at
http://www.economist.com/node/4148885/.
93. Heather Boushey & Joshua Holland, If This Is Such a Rich Country, Why
Are We Getting Squeezed?, ALTERNET (July 17, 2007),
http://www.altemet.org/story/57180/if this is such a richcountr/o2C why-are.
we-getting-squeezed (noting that the typical working family puts in an extra 533
hours of work per year compared to a generation ago to maintain the same standard
of living).
94. The White House's Middle Class Task Force, supra note 29, at 9.
95. In 1980, 40% of workers were covered by pensions. By 2004, the
percentage was reduced to 20. See The Plastic Safety Net, supra note 91, at 18.
Worker pensions are further unstable due to privatization and securitization. See
Soederberg, supra note 74, at 224-41.
96. Jacob S. Hacker, The Middle Class at Risk, in BROKE: How DEBT
BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 220 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012).
97. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 172.
98. See generally Porter, supra note 29, at 1-21.
99. Hacker, supra note 96 at 218-34.
100. Id.
101. See generally ANDREW Ross SWORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE
STORY OF How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FAUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM FROM CRISIS -AND THEMSELVES. (Mti. Upd. Ed., Penguin Books, 2011)
(2009) (a popular phrase to describe certain financial institutions which are so large
and interconnected that their failure would destroy the entire economic system).
102. See generally BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 218-
34 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012).
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decrease in total wealth in terms of assets for the majority of the U.S.
population. From 1947 to 1979, worker income increased with
productivity percentage gains.103  Since 1979, real wages have
increased only 0.4% annually while productivity has grown 2%
annually.'1 From 1987 to 1997, corporate profits rose 90% while the
median family income rose only 3%. o0 During the past three
decades, middle class incomes have not risen when adjusted for
inflation.'06  The income distribution for the top 10% of the class
structure has steadily increased over the last twenty-five years, with
only slight reductions during recessions. Economist Emmanuel Saez
writes: "After decades of stability in the post-war period, the top
decile [10%] share has increased dramatically over the last twenty-
five years and has now regained its pre-war levels. Indeed, the top
decile share in 2007 is equal to 49.7[%], a level higher than any other
year since 1917 and even surpasses 1928, the peak of stock market
bubble in the 'roaring' 1920s."l07
Middle class Americans have also experienced a decrease in total
wealth in terms of assets. For example, equity value in homes from
2005 to 2008 diminished by 43% from 2005 to 2008.108 During this
time, an estimated $2 trillion in retirement savings were lost in 401(k)
and individual retirement accounts.109 Further, over fifty million
working middle class Americans lack health care insurance, resulting
in a large percentage of their income being used to pay for health
care."10 Thus, middle class Americans are living in a state of
economic and social insecurity and downward mobility."'
103. The White House's Middle Class Task Force, supra note 29, at 3. See
also Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States
1913-1998, CXVIII(1) Q. J. OF EcoN. 1 (2003).
104. The White House's Middle Class Task Force, supra note 29, at 3. See
also Piketty, supra note 103.
105. Hacker, supra note 96, at 201.
106. See Piketty, supra note 104, at 37-38.
107. Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the
United States 3(2009), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8dplf9lx; see
also, Piketty, supra note 104, at 2.
108. Hacker, supra note 97, at 222.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 221.
111. See generally HUGH GUsTERSON & CATHERINE BESTEMAN, THE
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The financial sector preyed on the vulnerable middle class
because it knew wage stagnation and loss of wealth would mean
consumers would lose purchasing power. If consumers could no
longer purchase manufactured goods, then corporate income and
profits would fall, lowering the financial return to the upper classes. In
response, revolving consumer credit became increasingly available"12
and consumer borrowing kept profits high for lending institutions.1 13
This opportunistic hocking of debt at teaser rates to the middle class
created favorable conditions for debtfare to rise as a way of life for a
majority of Americans.
For lower classes in the U.S., this insecurity, social
disorganization, and economic destruction has manifested in a carceral
state, which increases disciplinary practices and creates
"prisonfare."ll 4 Increases in police forces, courts, and prisons are the
"institutional machinery" and the "symbolic frames" through which
neoliberal tenets are being socially imprinted on the lower class
populations." For the middle classes, easy credit and borrowing
were the solution for economic insecurity and downward mobility.
Debt structures arose as a fundamental mechanism of neoliberal
INSECURE AMERICAN: How WE GOT HERE & WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT
(Univ. of Cal. Press 2010).
112. See David Harvey, Professor at the Graduate Center of the City
University of New York, Lecture on the Crisis of Capitalisn,
http://davidharvey.org/2010/06/rsa-crises-of-capitalism-talk-animated/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2012).
113. This is the process by which banks endogenously expand money supply
in response to demand for funds. Schumpeter describes endogenous money this
way: "[T]here is another method of obtaining money for this purpose. . . This
method of obtaining money is the creation of purchasing power by banks . . . It is
always a question, not of transforming purchasing power which already exists in
someone's possession, but of the creation of a new purchasing power out of
nothing...." J.A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 73 (5th
ed., Redvers Opie trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1955).
114. WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 51, at 304. (developing the
phrase "prisonfare" to describe a shift in U.S. governing philosophy and practice
from welfare to workfare and prisonfare for the lower, destabilized classes. He
writes: "the rolling back of the social safety net and the rolling out of the police-and-
prison dragnet and their knitting together into a carceral-assistantial lattice" is an
exercise in state crafting).
115. Wacquant, Crafting, supra note 84, at 213.
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policies.'16  Interconnected debt enforcement structures work to
confine middle class individuals into servicing debt relations as a
primary form of existence."' 7  State and federal policy, laws, and
courts work from without and within the bankruptcy system as
institutional machinery that imprints neoliberal tenets onto the middle
class. Legally mandated debt structures, similar to police and prisons,
lock participants into particular life choices and limit future
possibilities by requiring their situated participation in unequal and
unfree capitalist debt relations. Compared to the upper classes, the
lower classes experience the opposite visage of neoliberalism: a
paternalistic contraction of life chances antithetical to the upper-class
liberalization.
A. America's Middle Income Families and the Market Conditions
Creating the Possibility of "Debtfare"
The average American family currently lives in a state of debtfare:
mortgage debt," 8 revolving credit card debt," 9 home equity debt,120
and educational debt.121 Debtfare is not simply one debt form, such as
a mortgage or a credit card. It is the interlocking of several debt forms
that limit and imprison the typical consumer into servicing debt
116. Campbell, supra note 51, at 65-69.
117. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 160-65.
118. FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL RESERVE,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20120308/zlr-2.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2012) (demonstrating that in 2010, the average consumer mortgage debt reached
over $10 billion).
119. The Plastic Safety Net, supra note 90, at 7-10 (describing how in 2005,
the average credit card debt for low and middle-income indebted households in
America was $8,650. The majority of households had been in debt for longer than a
year with the average length being 43 months, or just over three and half years.).
120. Id. at 14-17 ("Homeowners increasingly look to their home equity as a
source of funds to help deal with rising household debt. . . . [Of] over 30 million
U.S. households, 40 percent of the homeowners in our survey refinanced or got a
second mortgage during the past three years. Over half of these households used
proceeds from a mortgage refinance ... to pay down credit card debt.").
121. THE NAT'L Ass'N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATTORNEYS, THE STUDENT
LOAN "DEBT BOMB": AMERICA'S NEXT MORTGAGE-STYLE ECONOMIC CRISIS?
(2012), available at http://nacba.org/Portals/0/Documents/Student%2OLoan%20
Debt/ 020712%20NACBA%20student%20loan%20debt%20report.pdf [hereinafter
The Student Loan Debt Bomb].
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relations as a primary form of social and economic participation. It is
a combined debt load that crushes and bankrupts middle class
individuals. In the last thirty years, with the liberalization of the
financial markets, the necessary conditions were created to facilitate
this consumer debt load. These conditions include deregulation of
markets, Wall Street's securitization inventions, the Federal Reserve's
historically low interest rates, lenders' internal practices, and middle
class wage stagnation.
In the last three decades, the U.S. government, working with the
financial sector, loosened major laws protecting the collective
integrity of the banking and credit institutions. 122  These rollbacks
included weakening lending regulations' 23 and eliminating the
oversight of financial authorities, facilitating the creation of mortgage-
backed securities and eliminating consumer protections in credit card
lending.124  This deregulation gave holders of capital and capital
122. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE
HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010); see also GRETCHEN
MORGENSON & JOSHUA ROSNER, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT: How OUTSIZED
AMBITION, AND CORRUPTION LED TO ECONOMIC ARMAGEDDON (2011); see also
GILLIAN TETT, FOOLS GOLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF J.P. MORGAN AND How WALL
ST. GREED CORRUPTED ITS BOLD DREAM AND CREATED A FINANCIAL
CATASTROPHE (2009).
123. TETT, supra note 122, at 73 (describing how on November 12, 1999,
President Bill Clinton signed the Financial Services Modemization Act of 1999
effectively killing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The Glass-Steagall act created a
firm demarcation for banks between trading of debt and equity securities and
commercial banking. The 1933 law set up a regulatory structure that protected
consumers and individual investors. This put into place the notion of combining
commercial and investment banking to construct "one-stop shopping" banking
empires. The 1999 legislation is considered the work of Sanford I. Weill, the chief
executive of Travelers Group, which he wanted to merge with Citibank to create
Citigroup. The Glass-Steagall Act stood in the way.). See also MORGENSON &
ROSNER, supra note 122, at 106-77; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 122, at 109.
124. In Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service
Corp., the Supreme Court interpreted the National Bank Act to permit the banking
industry to charge interest rates allowed by the state in which the bank is located.
Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299
(1978). Such rates could be exported to consumers in other states even if the rate
was above the consumer's home state's usury limits. The holding in this case began
the deregulation of state usury laws. See James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil,
51 S. C. L. REv. 445 (2002); See also Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of Usury
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markets greater freedom, power, and mobility.' 25 Lending activities
increasingly took place outside the oversight of financial authorities,
thereby leaving checks on such activities to market "pricing and
counterparty surveillance" as the basis for sustaining safety and
soundness.' 26 Non-regulated entities began to dominate the financial
world to such a degree that by 2006, "only about a quarter of all
lending occurred in regulated sectors, down from about 80[%] twenty
years before."' 27
In this deregulation climate, investment institutions were able to
create new forms of investment products by packaging loans as asset
backed securities ("ABS") (e.g., Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
("CMO")128 and Collateralized Loan Obligations ("CLO")).12 9 Such
Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, 53 S.D. L. REV. 37
(2008) (explaining that usury laws varied by state and limited the interest rates
lenders could charge. In effect, they cost banks profits. Therefore, lending costs
were incredibly high until the Marquette holding establishing the "lex loci" rule later
extended to include late fees as a kind of interest. See Simley v. Citibank, 517 U.S.
735 (1996)). In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 was enacted by Congress, further removing the power from the
states.
125. WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 51, at 305 (arguing that
the economy and financial sector are experiencing the most liberalization: "[C]ontrol
is now being re-emphasized in every area of social life-with the singular and
startling exception of the economy, from whose deregulated domain most of today's
major risks routinely emerge.").
126. CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY,
HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 54 (2008) (citing the economic
philosophy of Former Treasury Chairman, Alan Greenspan). See also TETr, supra
note 122, at 75. ("Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan had long been a champion of free-
market principles, and by 1999 he was a leading voice against regulation . . .
[Greenspan declared:] 'By far the most significant event in finance in the past
decade has been the extraordinary development and expansion of financial
derivatives .. ."').
127. MORRIS, supra note 126, at 54.
128. Id. at 40 ("The CMO . . . had a profound impact on the mortgage
industry. Traditionally mortgage lenders were one-stop shops-they interviewed
applicants, approved the credits, held the mortgages, collected monthly payments,
and managed default workouts and foreclosures. Within a few years of the advent of
the CMO, the industry decomposed into highly focused subsectors. Mortgage
bankers solicited and screened applicants. Thinly capitalized mortgage banks bid for
the loans and held them until they had enough to support a CMO. Investment banks
designed and marketed the CMO bonds. Servicing specialists managed collections
and defaults."). See generally TErr, supra note 122.
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financial products generated enormous profits for investors out of
payment streams on loans.' They also allowed substantial gain at no
cost to banks. Attempting to generate fees in the lending and
securitization process, banks heavily advertised to consumers and
engaged in reckless and deceptive lending practices.
In the consumer mortgage market, the debtfare process for the
middle class is particularly apparent. The liberalization of the
financial world incentivized banks to entice middle class Americans to
take on more secured debt in the form of mortgages and equity loans.
To facilitate the transfer of the risk to other investors in the ABS
process, mortgage lenders sought to quicken the mortgage lending
process to collect fees and sell the resulting loan payment stream.
Unregulated lenders relaxed their lending standards to facilitate the
securitization process by engaging in egregious underwriting
practices: "teaser rates," 131 "stated income" loans, "no doc" loans, and
"liar" loans.132  Lenders offered consumers risky adjustable rate
mortgages and interest-only loans.' 33 These practices increased the
home ownership rate from 64% in 1994 to 69.9% in 2004.134 Of these
129. MORRIS, supra note 126, at 60. ("The bankers ... had seen how
residential mortgage bankers could run booming lending businesses with only wisps
of capital. The secret was securitization-packing up loans in the form of
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and selling them off to pension
funds .... banks embraced securization. Instead of holding their commercial loans,
corporate loans, high-yield takeover loans, emerging market loans, . . . on their
books, the way bankers always had done, they began to package them up as
collateralized loan obligations").
130. Id.
131. A teaser rate is a very low but temporary introductory rate that increases
significantly after the initial period. See Katalina M. Bianco, The Subprime Lending
Crisis: Causes and Effects of the Mortgage Meltdown, in CCH MORTGAGE
COMPLIANCE GUIDE AND BANK DIGEST 7 (2008), available at
http://business.cch.com/bankingfinance/focus/news/subprime3wp-rev.pdf.
132. "Stated income," "no doc" or "liar" loans are those where the borrower
does not provide documentation to substantiate the income stated on the application
to finance a home purchase. See id.
133. Id. See also Jerry Anthony, Home Burdens: The High Costs of
Homeownership, in BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 78
(Katherine Porter ed., 2012).
134. See generally Bianco, supra note 131. See also Anthony, supra note 134.
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loans, the subprime mortgagel35 rate increased from 9% in 1996 to
20% in 2006. 136
Consumers were further encouraged to take out home equity loans
or second mortgages to supplement their incomes. Bankers
considered home equity an asset reserve and encouraged consumers to
tap into it.137  From 2001 to 2006, through its "Live Richly"
campaign, Citibank told consumers, "There's got to be at least
$25,000 hidden in your house. We can help you find it."13 s Fleet, now
part of Bank of America, asked consumers, "Is your mortgage
squeezing your wallet? Squeeze back." 3 9  Wells Fargo told
consumers to "Seize your someday." 4 0  These campaigns urged
consumers to take on second mortgages to pay off credit cards,141
remodel or renovate their homes, purchase high-ticket items, or take a
vacation. These campaigns worked. The amount of outstanding home
equity loans grew from $1 billion in 1982 to $188 billion in 1988, and
the outstanding debt reached $1 trillion in 2007.142 In 1978, home
135. Mara Lee, Subprime Mortgages: A Primer, NPR (Mar. 23, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9085408 (explaining that
subprime mortgages are "given to borrowers with credit scores of 620 or below....
Because subprime borrowers are seen as 'higher risk,' their loans carry interest rates
that are at least 2 percentage points higher than those offered to borrowers with
better credit.").
136. Bianco, supra note 131, at 6.
137. Paul Allen & Bill Pearson, And Next for Retail Credit ... Boom or Bust
for Bankers?, 9 J. RETAIL BANKING SERVICES 5-15 (Winter 1987/1988). ("The
relatively stable amount of unencumbered financial assets and tremendous reserves
of household equity that exists . . . [estimated at over $1.5 trillion in 1986] ...
should help sustain retail credit demand in the more attractive segments of the
market.").
138. Louise Story, Home Equity Frenzy Was a Bank Ad Come True, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/business/
5sell.html?pagewanted=all.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. BRETT WILLIAMS, DEBT FOR SALE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE CREDIT
TRAP 18-25 (2004). See also The Plastic Safety Net, supra note 91, at 14 (explaining
that in 2005, the mortgage lending industry promoted consolidation and refinancing
of unsecured credit card debt using a home equity line making the debt secured
against the consumer's home).
142. Anthony, supra note 133, at 78; Story, supra note 139.
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equity loans totaled only $20 million. 4 3 Once considered a loan of
last resort, lenders convinced consumer borrowers that second
mortgages were a good idea.'"
Instead of protecting consumers from these predatory lending
practices, former Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan
supported "equity extraction" as a way to pay-down high interest rate
credit cards.14 5 In 2004, Greenspan encouraged banks at America's
Community Bankers Annual Convention to continue to assist
consumers with "extract[ing] some of that built-up equity in their
homes," because "the surge in cash-out mortgage refinancing likely
improved rather than worsened the financial condition of the average
homeowner."l46 This equity extraction served to convert unsecured
debt to secured debt, increasing the debt servitude of America's
middle class.
Another type of middle class debtfare is revolving unsecured
credit. Deregulation and asset-backed securities also spurred lenders
to reach out to consumers through credit card payment streams,
encouraging greater debt loads among the middle class. During the
mid to late 1980s, the banking industry was told to gear up for "retail
credit securitization."1 47 The first credit card asset backed securities
were issued in 1987.148 As part of securitization, the Journal ofRetail
Banking advised its readers to tap into the debt capacity of middle
income consumers, arguing, "Fortunately for retail banks, there is still
significant debt capacity in the consumer market, even though some
segments are already over stretched." 49 During this time, the banking
industry aggressively marketed revolving unsecured credit to a broad
143. Allen & Pearson, supra note 137.
144. Anthony, supra note 133, at 78.
145. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at Am.'s Cmty.
Bankers Annual Convention: The Mortgage Market and Consumer Debt. (Oct. 19,
2004), available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddoc/speeches/2004/20 0 4 1019/
default.htm.
146. Id.
147. Allen & Pearson, supra note 137, at 7.
148. MARK FURLETTI, AN OVERVIEW OF CREDIT CARD ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES 1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2002), available at
www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards.center/
events/workshops/2002/CreditCardSecuritization_01 2002.pdf.
149. Allen & Pearson, supra note 137, at 7.
252012]
25
Coco: Debtor's Prison in the Neoliberal State: "Debtfare" and the Cultu
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2012
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
cross-section of consumers using misleading language and offering
debt as supplemental income.s 0 In 2008, the credit card asset backed
security market was a $915 billion investors market.' 5 ' Credit card
asset-backed securities have become the primary vehicle by which the
credit card industry funds unsecured loans to consumers.152
For middle-class American consumers, credit cards are not wealth
generating. Credit cards are used to supplement income and provide a
"safety net" for consumers faced with unexpected car and home
repairs, illness and medical expenses, job loss, and basic living
expenses.153 Downward mobility for the majority of Americans was
in full swing during the 1980s and 1990s when real wages began to
stagnate while the costs of living increased. Just when they needed it
most, the banking industry offered families in need opportunities to
take on more unsecured debt through the tools described above.154
Attempting to maintain basic standards of living,'55 many Americans
latched onto easy credit.156 Outstanding consumer debt totals for 2009
150. WILLIAMS, supra note 141, at 55-57 (explaining that the banking
industry, when discussing target marketing consumers for credit cards, used
metaphors of war and water such as beachhead, penetrate, saturation, float, debt
capacity, and target.); see also, Mercatante, supra note 124.
151. Morris, supra note 126, at 121.
152. FURLETTI, supra note 148, at 1.
153. The Plastic Safety Net, supra note 90, at 7-15.
154. WILLIAMS, supra note 141, at 9; ("In 1991, [bankers] observed that
maxed-out citizens were finding it difficult to buy groceries and pay taxes, noted the
increasing costs of health insurance, and scurried to capture that market. For
example, Credit Card Management . . . noted that 'rising health care costs may be
the catalyst needed to make credit card acceptance among health care providers
commonplace.' In 1991, Visa and Mastercard pushed hard on supermarkets,
knowing that they were concerned about the recession. They urged these stores to
accept credit cards to drive up sales . . .").
155. Basic standard of living means a wage hovering around $50,000 a year.
Historical Income Tables: Households, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/ (last visited
Aug. 28, 2012).
156. The Plastic Safety Net, supra note 90, at 4.
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were $886 billion, up from $680 billion in 2000.157 In 2012, the
projected consumer credit card debt is approximately $870 billion.'58
Finally, educational loans are another type of debtfare the middle
class experiences. In the late 1980s, the Journal of Retail Banking
Services ("Journal") discussed various ways subscriber banks could
entice consumers to take on revolving credit loans, creating reliable
investment securities. The Journal proposed "cross-selling new
educational and health care credit products to underleveraged
consumers."1 59  Consumers over the last three decades were
encouraged to take on unsecured loans to pay for education. Last
year, collective outstanding student loan debt reached $1 trillion; the
average college graduate owes $25,250 at graduation.16 0
B. Debt Trap and BAPCPA
The interconnected debt obligations of debtfare create a debt trap.
For the majority of Americans, servicing some form of debt is the
norm and debtfare is a way of life. As sociologists Hugh Gusterson
and Catherine Besteman explain:
[Debt is] an essential feature of neoliberal society. It greases the
wheels of consumerism by enabling Americans to stretch to the
edge of their means; it is also an apparatus for transferring
wealth ... from those who need money to those who already have
more; and by squeezing more work out of the indebted it enforces
social discipline."'61
Thus, the debt trap results in financial distress and failure, causing
consumers to turn to the bankruptcy system for relief. Increased
consumer debt increases consumer bankruptcy filings.162 The more
consumers owe in various forms of debt obligations, the more
157. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, THE 2012 STAT. ABSTRACT: THE NAT'L DATA
BOOK, 740 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/
12statab/banking.pdf.
158. Id.
159. Allen &Pearson, supra note 137, at 9.
160. The Student Loan Debt Bomb, supra note 121, at 1.
161. GUSTERSON & BESTEMEN, supra note 111, at 7.
162. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION
OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETs AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2006).
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consumer bankruptcies are filed.16 3 Unmanageable debt loads are the
only reason for consumer filings; consumers enter into bankruptcy to
deal with burdensome debt. Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the
debtor was presumed a good faith actor and received a fresh start
through bankruptcy. However, BAPCPA presumes that the debtor is a
bad actor until her or she proves otherwise. Once filed, BAPCPA
forces the debtor to pay creditors a portion of the debtor's income and
live on a "bread and water" diet for years. Similar to the IMF's
approach to debtor nations, under BAPCPA, debtors experience
legally mandated austerity to squeeze every dollar from the financially
distressed debtor.'"
III. BARRIERS, TRAP DOORS, AND PAYMENT PLANS: BANKRUPTCY
REFORM REINFORCES "DEBTFARE"
BAPCPA is one of the disciplining practices of the neoliberal
state. Similar to Wacquant's discussion of the expansion of the penal
apparatuses in the form of more police and prisons invading and
regulating the lower classes, BAPCPA expands the power of the
federal bankruptcy system to regulate the lives of middle class
Americans. The provisions of the 2005 Act operate as deterrents,
barriers, and disciplinary tools that ultimately make it difficult for the
debtor to emerge from the bankruptcy system with its intended benefit
of a fresh start. As a result, consumers delay the time of filing or
forgo filing the bankruptcy petition entirely. The debtor is therefore
denied even the minimal protections still remaining from the 1978
Code.
BAPCPA's impact on the middle class is effectuated in many
areas. First, the Act seeks to re-moralize consumer debt relations as
well as reignite and re-enforce the social stigma of debtors, denying
them access to a fresh start. Second, the Act creates increased fiscal
and procedural barriers to entry for the consumer in financial distress.
Third, once in the bankruptcy system, trap doors and pitfalls work to
ambush the unwary or the unrepresented, resulting in needy debtors
falling out of the bankruptcy system and losing the protection of the
163. Robert M. Lawless, The Paradox of Consumer Credit, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 347, 363 (2007).
164. See Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of
Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 578-80 (2009).
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automatic stay. Fourth, after the debtor survives the initial filing
requirements, the debtor's income and expenses are scrutinized to
determine the disposable income and the kind of relief, if any,
available to the debtor. Finally, BAPCPA reduces the "fresh start"
benefits of bankruptcy by requiring repayment plans and reaffirmation
agreements, making more debts non-dischargeable, limiting
dischargeability of debts, and limiting dollar amounts of exempt
property. BAPCPA's mandated austerity reduces the overall benefits
gained from the bankruptcy process. As a result, debtors do not get a
fresh start.
A. Stigma: Re-Imposing a Cultural "KEEP OUT" Sign
"Stigma is decreasing for bankruptcy filers. Debtors do not feel
ashamed."165
BAPCPA was enacted in response to the increased volume of
consumer bankruptcy petitions filed since the enactment of the 1978
Code. Relying on the notion that bankruptcy is a moral act, Congress
indicated that the purpose of the new law was to instill a sense of
responsibility and integrity in the consumer debtor. In the House
Report, Congress adopted the view that the social stigma associated
with filing a bankruptcy petition has waned, and that, as Greenspan
said, "personal bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost
their sense of shame."' 66  Congress, therefore, desired to "re-
stigmatize" the consumer bankruptcy debtor with the enactment of
BAPCPA. The Act manifests this intention by eliminating the 1978
Bankruptcy Code's presumption that a debtor is filing a petition in
good faith, which favors granting debt relief.16 7 In effect, BAPCPA
imposes instead a bad faith hurdle, hindering debtors from obtaining
debt relief.168
165. Interview with Alan LRV (Fall 2002) (notes on file with author). See also
Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It is Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 177 (1999) (arguing there is a severe reduction of social stigma associated with
filing for bankruptcy relief).
166. Consumer Bankruptcy Rate Up in Three States, USA TODAY, (July 20,
2007, 4:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-07-20-
487927626_x.htm.
167. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010).
168. Id.
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Little empirical evidence supports the notion that the stigma
associated with bankruptcy had actually and substantially declined. In
fact, evidence suggests the opposite. The Consumer Bankruptcy
Project data that have tracked consumer bankruptcy debtors for over
twenty years supports "an alternative view that the stigma of
bankruptcy has actually increased over the twenty-year period we
have studied, and that bankruptcy filings may have risen despite
increased shame about declaring bankruptcy."' 69 Further, economists
studying the impact of stigma on bankruptcy filings report that there is
not a positive correlation between heightened stigma and lowered
rates of bankruptcy filings. 70 Rather, burdensome debt loads result in
increased bankruptcy filings.171
In BAPCPA, Congress established a moral overlay upon legal
processes, complicating and masking the systemic economic structure
that is the foundation of each debtor's experience in bankruptcy. The
desire to impose stigma or shame upon debtors brings morality onto
rational legal structures. Legal debts, unlike moral debts, can be
forgiven.172 By enforcing the belief that debt and bankruptcy are
sins,'73 that bankruptcy is shameful, and that the debtor will be
socially stigmatized by the community and family members,
BAPCPA delays and prevents individuals in financial distress from
filing a bankruptcy petition. Thus, BAPCPA's effect is contrary to
"[tihe purpose of bankruptcy, [which] is to protect those in financial,
not moral, difficulty." 74
Numerous individuals in dire need of bankruptcy protection and
relief postpone filing a bankruptcy petition because of the social
169. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 218.
170. Kartik Athreya, Shame as it Ever Was: Stigma and Personal Bankruptcy,
90 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 2, 3 (2004), available at
http://www.rich.frb.org/publications/research/economic-quarterly/2004/spring/pdf/a
threya.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Graeber, supra note 1, at 120. ("Legal-rather than moral-debts have
other unique qualities. For instance, they can be forgiven, which isn't always
possible with moral debt.").
173. MARGARET ATWOOD, PAYBACK: DEBT AND THE SHADOW SIDE OF
WEALTH 41 (2008) (discussing the historical connection between debt and sin).
174. Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (1982).
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stigma associated with debtor status.1 75  However, waiting to file a
bankruptcy petition often yields the worst possible result for both
debtors and creditors. During the non-filing period, debtors are likely
to take on more debts in an effort to survive. Also, debtors, in an
effort to manage what is ultimately unmanageable, convert unsecured
credit card debt into secured debt (by acquiring home equity loans)
that will ultimately require full repayment. Unless a debtor's income
increases, he or she is unable to manage the debt load alone and
ultimately will need to file for bankruptcy. Acquiring secured debt
during this delay period makes it more likely than not that a debtor
will be forced into a chapter 13 repayment plan, as opposed to a
chapter 7 full discharge proceeding.
Members of Congress, legal scholars, and some bankruptcy legal
field actors who hold the conviction that social stigma should attach to
the bankruptcy debtor status propagate this moral overlay. These
actors believe that reducing or eliminating stigma for bankruptcy
debtors would eliminate the much needed moral overlay.'7 ' Debt
would be perceived simply as a contractual legal relationship rather
than a moral obligation which is not undone by a bankruptcy filing.
Although members of Congress and others assert that stigma should
not be eliminated from bankruptcy, they are mistaken about the true
benefits of advancing a shaming procedure to manage debtfare and the
middle class.
175. Interview with a bankruptcy debtor, in Berkeley, Cal. (June 2011). Linda
Coco, Beyond Failure and Forgiveness: The Debtor's Place in American Fiscal
Identity, Bankruptcy and Capitalism (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author) ("One informant, Mary,
describes the impact of the cultural discourse of stigma in the following manner:
I experienced such a burden from the social stigma from external and internal
sources that I put off actually acting in my best interest. My finances as a result of
the fear generated about the stigma were so much worse; my life so much more
difficult because of the delay in filing the bankruptcy petition. Once I went through
the bankruptcy process, the stigma and the pressure disappeared. The social pressure
from the stigma operates before the actual filing of the bankruptcy petition. The
fears of bankruptcy are unfounded about what financial failure all mean socially,
economically and every other way. Before the bankruptcy petition filing, I felt
almost suicidal. This feeling was completely unfounded and unnecessary. Self-
hatred and turmoil ruled my life. Before I filed, I tried to pay the credit card debts.
This did not help me. That was irrational and it made everything worse. I actually
paid the [original] credit card debt in total repeatedly.").
176. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 1-4 (2005).
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B.. Barriers to Entry: Fees and Counseling
Increased costs and changes to the initial filing process place
greater burdens on the individual debtors than under the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. 'n Under the new law, a chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition filing fee increased from $195 to $245178 and a chapter 13 fee
increased from $155 to $235.9 In addition, individual debtors will
likely have to pay sizeable attorney's fees for representation in the
bankruptcy process.so Attorney's fees have increased due to the
increased workload and new responsibilities' ' placed on bankruptcy
attorneys as a result of the passage of BAPCPA.182  The increased
177. The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study, supra note 25.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (a)(1)(A) (2008). Section 325 of the 2005 Act
designated this dollar amount as $220. Subsequently, the amount was increased to
$245 by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171 § 10101 (2006),
effective Apr. 9, 2006.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (a)(1)(B) (2008). Section 352 of the 2005 Act initially
decreased the filing fee from $155 to $150. The amount was increased to $235 by
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171 § 10101 (2006), effective
Apr. 9, 2006.
180. The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study, supra note 25, at 6.
181. 11 U.S.C.§ 707 (b)(4)(B), (C), & (D) (2010). Under revised § 707(b),
sanctions are imposed against debtor's attorney if the case is dismissed as an abuse
under § 707(b) and the court finds that the attorney violated rule 9011 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the bankruptcy equivalent to Civil Rule 11: a rule
that authorizes a court to impose sanctions against an attorney who commences a
frivolous action). Another component of the new sanctions legislation provides that
the signature of a debtor's attorney on the bankruptcy petition is a certification that
the attorney has "performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances that
gave rise to the petition " and determined that "the petition . . . is well grounded in
fact; and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension ...
and does not constitute an abuse." See § 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(C)(ii)(I) & (II)
(2010). And under the new BAPCPA provisions, debt relief agencies are given
further restrictions and mandates. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 526-528 (2010). The Supreme
Court recently held that bankruptcy attorneys are "debt relief agencies" covered by
these new provisions. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S. 130 S. Ct. 1324
(2010).
182. See James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 Mo. L. REv. 863, 874-76
(2006) (describing how after conducting qualitative research with several consumer
debtor attorneys, Professor White discovered that the costs of legal representation
for individual consumers in the bankruptcy process increased since the enactment of
BAPCPA. The fee hike is related to the need to collect and verify debtor information
necessitating multiple meetings with clients prior to filing the petition.).
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workload and responsibilities also mean individuals are less likely to
be able to navigate the bankruptcy system alone, thereby increasing
the number of debtors who must hire an attorney.
The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study reports that attorney fees
for both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases have significantly increased as
a result of BAPCPA. Researchers found a 24% increase in the national
mean attorney fee in chapter 13 cases from $2061 for pre-BAPCPA
cases to $2564 in post-BAPCPA cases.183  Similarly, in chapter 7
cases, there has been an increase in the national mean attorney fee of
30% from $821 to $1072 (in cases with assets) or 48% from $654 to
$968 (in cases with no assets). 8 4  Researchers concluded that
consumer debtors are paying significantly more in fees to receive the
intended relief; in many instances, this increase in fees prevents the
neediest individuals from accessing the bankruptcy court.1 85
Another barrier to entry includes new eligibility requirements.
Under BAPCPA, individual consumer debtors are obligated to attend
a briefing in credit counseling prior to becoming eligible for
bankruptcy filing.' 86  This means that before filing a bankruptcy
petition, an individual in financial distress must engage in a
cumbersome process involving: (1) contacting an approved agency;
(2) paying that agency $50; (3) listening to a credit briefing; and (4)
obtaining a certificate of credit counseling.' 87  Although the debtor
may attempt to file for bankruptcy without the certificate, the court
may only grant the debtor a waiver in "exigent circumstances" or in
the case of an inability to obtain counseling within five days of
filing.'8 8  However, these waivers are not liberally granted since a
183. The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study, supra note 25, at 6-7.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 111-13.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2010) ("An individual may not be a debtor under
this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of
filing the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit and
credit counseling agency described in section 111(a) an individual or group briefing
... that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling").
187. First Shore Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison C. Hudson (In re
Hudson), 352 B.R. 391 (2006); (considering the meaning of the new BAPCPA
provision requiring debtors to obtain a credit briefing in the 180-day period
proceeding the date of filing of the petition).
188. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(B)(4) (2010).
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bankruptcy judge must find the explanation for failing to obtain a
credit briefing credible and satisfactory. A credible and satisfactory
explanation must be something beyond the normal circumstances of
financial distress. 89 In the likely event the court denies the waiver,
the debtor's petition is automatically dismissed.
Another section of BAPCPA 90 imposes several new initial filing
requirements for the consumer debtor: "payment advices" for the 60
days prior to filing from all employers of the debtor;' 91 a statement of
net monthly income;192 and a statement disclosing any reasonably
anticipated increase in income or expenditures over the twelve-month
period following the date of filing.' 93 Debtors are also required to file
a copy of income tax returns for the previous year,' 94 or, if the court so
orders, a copy of the previous three years' returns.195 Debtors' failure
to file any of these documents results in immediate dismissal of their
cases.196
Such immediate dismissals create additional problems for debtors,
particularly because of stay limitations of the new amendments for
multiple petitions filed within one year. These problems are discussed
in more detail below.
189. Dixon v. LaBarge, 338 B.R. 383, 388 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (agreeing
with the ruling in the Bankruptcy Court holding that the debtor found himself in
self-created circumstances because he had 20 days under Missouri foreclosure law
within which to obtain a credit briefing. The court says, in effect, that the normal
circumstances of financial distress are not exigent.).
190. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
191. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2012).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(v) (2012).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(vi) (2012).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 521(f)(2) (2012).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(B) (2012).
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C. Repeat Filing and BAPCPA's Trap Doors1 9 7
New provisions under BAPCPA are targeted at curbing and
limiting a debtor's ability to file more than once. The most significant
of these limitations is the added provision limiting and denying the
automatic stay to individuals who had one or more cases pending
before the bankruptcy court in the previous year.' In the bankruptcy
process, the automatic stay is the most powerful protection for
debtors.' 99 It prevents creditors from taking action against debtors or
their property. It also provides debtors with critical time to evaluate
their financial situation without the additional pressure of credit calls,
harassment, and foreclosures. BAPCPA severely limits the automatic
stay for debtors who file successive bankruptcy petitions.200  In
addition, the new provisions create a rebuttable presumption that
subsequent petitions are filed in bad faith.201' This presumption is
particularly problematic for chapter 13 debtors who must satisfy new
197. Interview with Steven Derby, Bankruptcy Judge, in Baltimore, Md. (Nov.
15, 2006) ("The new Act works similar to a series of trap doors. The debtor must
comply with a new requirement under the Act, or the door will open and the debtor
will fall out of the bankruptcy system. Forcing the debtor back into the same
situation or worse because of new repeat filer provisions. The protections of the
bankruptcy system are eliminated.") (on file with author).
198. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2010) ("If a single or joint case is filed by or against
the debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or
joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was
dismissed . . . (A) stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with
respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to a any lease shall
terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later
case .... If a single or joint case is filed by or against the debtor who is an
individual in a case under this title, and if 2 or more single or joint cases of the
debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed ... the stay under
subsection (a) shall not go into effect upon the filing of the later case").
199. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 12 (1977) ("The automatic stay is one of the
most important protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. The stay provides the
debtor with the necessary breathing spell to arrange his financial affairs for a
repayment plan.").
200. See generally Lisa A. Napoli, The Not-So-Automatic Stay: Legislative
Changes to the Automatic Stay in a Case Filed by or Against an Individual Debtor,
79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 749 (2005).
201. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 (c)(3)(B) & (4)(B) (2010) (allowing the court to either
extend or impose the automatic stay on a showing by the debtor that the second
petition filing is in good faith).
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good faith requirements in the plan confirmation process. In many
cases, these two changes function together to completely bar any
bankruptcy debt relief.
For uninformed debtors, failing to comply with the technical
requirement of credit counseling may force them outside the
bankruptcy system's protections.2 02 Any cases that are immediately
dismissed for failure to file with a certificate or waiver are likely to be
immediately re-filed. However, those re-filed cases will fall within
the repeat filer provisions of BAPCPA, severely limiting or
eliminating altogether the automatic stay and triggering the bad faith
presumption. As a result, debtors who risk a second filing face an
additional burden of proving good faith or risking another
dismissal.2 0 3 If the case is dismissed a second time, all statutory
protections for those debtors against creditors are terminated. 204 Thus,
the credit counseling requirement, coupled with the limitation or
elimination of the automatic stay in repeat-filer cases, function to
leave debtors beyond the protection of the bankruptcy court if debtors
fail to obtain counseling or a waiver of the filing requirement.205
BAPCPA often functions most harshly against those who attempt
to settle debts outside the formal bankruptcy system, as recognized by
Bankruptcy Judge Frank Monroe in In re Sosa,2 06 an early BAPCPA
opinion. The chapter 13 debtors in Sosa attempted to work with their
mortgage holder to stop the foreclosure on their home until filing the
petition. Because of the timing, one of the debtors failed to obtain the
credit counseling before filing. Judge Monroe dismissed the case,
holding:
202. For example, a debtor in a foreclosure situation may rush to stop the
foreclosure process by filing a bankruptcy petition just a day before execution, but
he will not have the time to obtain a credit briefing. This debtor's petition is likely to
be dismissed. See Dixon v. LaBarge, 338 BR. 383, 388 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). See
also In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 889 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); see also In re
Randolph, 342 B.R. 633-635. (Bankr. M.D. Fl. 2005).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) (2010).
204. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (2010).
205. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 700-09 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (addressing
the consequences of a 109(h) dismissal of the debtor's petition and the impact of that
dismissal on the debtor's subsequent filing, and explaining that such a dismissal
results in a limitation on the automatic stay.).
206. In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W. D. of Tex., 2005).
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. . . because the debtors did not request such credit counseling
before they filed their case, Congress says they are ineligible for
relief under the Act. Can any rational human being make a cogent
argument that this makes sense? But let's not stop there. If the
Debtors' case is dismissed and they re-file a new case within the
next year... then the stay in the second case will only be good for
thirty days unless the debtor (i) files a motion, (ii) obtains a hearing
and ruling by the court within such thirty-day period and (iii)
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the second case was
filed in good faith.207
Like the Sosas, many debtors are prejudiced by the
interconnection of the two provisions and find themselves beyond the
protections of bankruptcy with little hope of returning. The new law
exploits the pro se filer's lack of knowledge about these two
provisions. Unrepresented filers are particularly susceptible to this
prejudice.
D. Increased Scrutiny and Requirements for the Bankruptcy Debtor
Once in Bankruptcy Process
Described as the heart of BAPCPA, the means test 208 provides
the first statutory screening mechanism to shift consumer debtors out
of chapter 7 and into chapter 13. Means test machinery operates to
prevent a debtor from filing a chapter 7 petition, increasing the
scrutiny of an individual debtor's fiscal identity and financial life.
This heightened scrutiny of the individual consumer debtor is new in
terms of statutory language. 209 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code created a
207. Id. at 115-17.
208. Means Test (Forms B22A and B22C) replaced the phrase "substantial
abuse" with "abuse," indicating that to allow the debtor to file a chapter 7 petition,
the debtor now needs to show that a filing of a chapter petition is not an "abuse."
Presumption: the debtor filing the petition is dishonest. (Trustees and Debtor
Attorneys call this the "mean test.") The burden of proving honesty is now on the
debtor and the debtor's attorney. Congress, with BAPCPA, deleted the language
from the 1978 Bankruptcy Code that provided a presumption in favor of granting the
debtor the discharge. Judicial Oversight is also REMOVED: United States Trustee
and the Chapter 13 Trustee now review the forms and make calculations as to
whether there is "abuse.").
209. Pre-BAPCPA, the United States Trustees Office in the Department of
Justice performed an informal means test on a case-by-case basis.
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presumption in favor of granting the debtor the relief sought.210 In an
attempt to carve away at the presumption in favor of debtor discharge,
the 1984 Amendments to the Code added a provision that allows the
United States Trustee to challenge the chapter 7 discharge if granting
the discharge would be a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy system.
If a finding of substantial abuse is established, the debtor's case is
dismissed or converted to a chapter 13 with the debtor's consent.211
The new law entirely removes the presumption in favor of granting
the relief.2 12 Instead, individuals in need of bankruptcy protection
must prove that they are eligible for the relief sought under chapter
7.213
210. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1984) added by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984. ("After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or
on a motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request of any interested
party in interest (creditor), may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under
this chapter [chapter 7] whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter.
There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor."
Under this subsection, the debtor filing a bankruptcy petition was honest. The
previous code section indicated: "a presumption in favor of granting relief requested
by the debtor" in the chapter 7 case. The burden of proving dishonesty was on the
Federal Government, United States Trustee's Office, and the judge had the
opportunity to exercise judicial discretion to determine whether "substantial abuse"
in fact existed).
211. Id. (explaining that "substantial abuse" was required for the United States
trustee to bring the motion and force the debtor into a chapter 13 repayment plan:
"(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the
United States trustee, but not at the request of any interested party in interest
(creditor), may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter
[chapter 7] whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of
relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor").
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(a), 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2010))
(giving the court, after notice and a hearing, on its own motion or on a motion by the
United States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any), or any party in
interest, the option to dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter
whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or with the debtor's consent, convert
such a case to a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting
of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter).
213. See generally Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing In The New § 707(B), 79
Am. BANKR. L. J. 231 (2005).
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Under the means test, debtors are permitted a diminutive
allowance that caps permissible living expenses.214 In drafting
BAPCPA, Congress decided the bankruptcy debtor's permissible
living expenses should be those specified in the Collection Financial
Standards of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").215  The IRS
crafted these allowed living expense standards for delinquent
taxpayers and income tax evaders. 2 16 The IRS will allow tax evaders
only those expenses which are deemed "necessary to provide for the
taxpayer's and his or her family's health and welfare and the
production of income." 2 17 For example, the guidelines give a family
of four living in Orange Country, Florida a monthly allowance of
$2200 for rent or mortgage and $765 for food.218 Thus, the standards
provide the taxpayer and his or her family with only the bare
minimum to live.2 19 This allowance, meant as a punishment for tax
evaders, imposes a harsh "bread and water" standard of living on the
debtor. Any income exceeding the allowance is interpreted by the
bankruptcy court as the debtor having the ability to pay unsecured
debts.220 Therefore, the debtor is treated as if he or she has committed
a crime or somehow engaged in illegal conduct like tax evasion. The
debtor is forced "to pay for" the transgression of acquiring debt in a
society that thrives on debt accumulation.
BAPCPA imposes these allowed amounts on the bankruptcy
debtor at two pivotal points when the bankruptcy process is initiated.
First, the allowance for the expenses is used to determine whether a
214. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2010) (stating that expenses include:
normal living expenses such as rent or mortgage, food, medical costs, taxes,
insurance etc., but expense under the Bankruptcy Code include amounts for secured
claims and priority claims.).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2010).
216. Internal Revenue Service, Collecting Process, INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL § 5(15)(1) [hereinafter IRM], available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/
part5/irm_05-015-001.html.
217. IRM, supra note 216, at § 5(15)(1)(1). See also, Wedoff, supra note 214,
at 254.
218. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, National Standards: Food, Clothing and
Other Expenses, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/
0,,id=104627,00.html.
219. IRM, supra note 216; Wedoff, supra note 213, at 254.
220. Wedoff, supra note 213, at 231 (explaining that new provision in §707(b)
creates "an apparently strict formula for presuming sufficient debt-paying ability").
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filing can remain in chapter 7 and receive a full discharge of
unsecured debts, or convert to a chapter 13 bankruptcy filing,
requiring the individual to repay unsecured creditors a portion or all of
the debt owed.22 1 Second, once in chapter 13, allowance for the
expenses is again used to determine the amount of "disposable
income" the debtor will be required to pay to unsecured creditors. 222
Disposable income is the amount chapter 13 debtors are required to
pay to the chapter 13 trustee over a three to five year period.223
In effect, BAPCPA regulates and controls debtors through intense
scrutiny down to the last dollar spent on food or toilet paper.2 2 4 In this
way, BAPCPA is a control mechanism aimed at managing the lower
and middle class. As markets, capitalists, and investors experience
increased financial freedom, the financial lives of middle class and
lower-income individuals are increasingly regulated. This dichotomy
reflects the essence of neoliberal policies instituted against the middle
and lower classes.
E. Reduction ofProtection and Benefit in Bankruptcy Process
Several new provisions in BAPCPA reduce the overall protection
and benefit debtors receive in bankruptcy cases. In both chapter 7 and
chapter 13, the intention of the drafters of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
is frustrated by new limitations on exemptions for debtors, caps on the
value of property exempted, increased protections for non-
governmental educational lenders, and forced reaffirmations for
debtors of pre-bankruptcy debts, just to name a few. In effect, then,
BAPCPA promulgates new powers of recovery for creditors, while
mandating increased debt responsibility for debtors. These new
221. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2010). See Wedoff, supra note 213, at 240-41
(comparing the calculations in the "means test" to the calculations for "disposable
income," which are identical).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2010) (stating that that debtors with incomes
above the median income for the local state are to propose a plan that provides for
payments over a five year period, while below median income debtors are to
propose plans of no less than three years).
224. See UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, OFFICIAL FORM 6J: SCHEDULE
J: CURRENT EXPENDITURES OF INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR(S), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BKForms_1207/B_006J
1207f.pdf.
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provisions destroy the spirit of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code by severely
limiting debtors' opportunities for fresh starts.
First, section 522(f),225 providing debtors with the ability to avoid
liens on exempt property, is limited by the operation of BAPCPA
section 313.226 In its original form, section 522(f) provided debtors
with the power to avoid judicial liens on any property to the extent
that the property could be exempted in the absence of the lien. This
section also gave debtors the power to avoid non-purchase money
security interest in certain household and personal goods.227 The new
provisions, however, adopt the Federal Trade Commission's limited
definition of "household goods."228 It specifies which items are not
household goodS229 and provides monetary and numerical caps for
electronics, jewelry, and antiques.2 30 Further, BAPCPA section 322231
imposes monetary thresholds on state homestead exemptions. Debtors
are limited to $136,875 of exempt value in any real property used as a
residence, but this monetary cap only applies if debtors acquired a
property within the 1215-day period before their petition was filed.2 32
Thus, these new provisions further limit the fresh start accorded to
debtors.
Second, under BAPCPA, section 220 debtors can no longer
discharge private educational loans, which have higher interest rates
and less flexibility in repayment.233 This provision marks a change
from the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which allowed debtors to discharge a
portion of their educational debts as long as a private lender held the
debt.234 Private lenders now enjoy the same status as the federal
225. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2010).
226. BAPCPA, supra note 2.
227. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)-(4) (2012).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. BAPCPA, supra note 2.
232. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) (2012).
233. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2012).
234. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) (2012) (stating private educational loans
are not exempt). See H.R. REP. No.. 95-595 at 132-152 (1977). (discussing the
dischargeability of student loans focused exclusively on the class of student loans
guaranteed under the Higher Education Act of 1965. Extensive concern was
expressed about potential abuse by lenders if educational loans are entirely non-
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government in the bankruptcy system because private loans are non-
dischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(8). 2 3 This change directly
contradicts the recommendation of the 1997 National Bankruptcy
Review Commission, calling for repeal of section 523(a)(8).236 Under
523(a)(8), debtors with significant student loan debt can only obtain
bankruptcy relief vis-i-vis those student loans by establishing undue
hardship in repaying both public and private student loans.23 7
Third, BAPCPA section 304 eliminates the option to reaffirm a
purchase money debt (VERY COMMON PHRASE IN
COMMERCIAL LAW AND BANKRUPTCY) on personal property.
Under the 1978 Code, chapter 7 debtors could choose to reaffirm a
purchase money debt on personal property or, in some circuits, simply
continue to pay on the debt and retain the property (identified as a
"ride-through"). Under BAPCPA, though, within forty-five days of
the meeting of creditors, chapter 7 debtors must either redeem the
property or enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the secured
creditor.238 BAPCPA also provides the form for reaffirmation 239 and
requires debtors to disclose income and expenses to show sufficient
funds to pay on the obligation. Once debtors sign the reaffirmation
agreement and the court accepts it, the pre-bankruptcy obligation
becomes a post-bankruptcy debt.
dischargeable. Particularly, this view is expressed by former House Representative
James O'Hara. This is precisely what BAPCPA does: it protects the private lender.).
235. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2012) (stating any other educational loan that
is a qualified educational loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual).
236. See REP. OF THE NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMMISSION, Vol. 1, at 6-17 (Oct.
20, 1997) (recommending that all educational loans be treated no differently than
other unsecured debts. The Commission explains that Congress, when it enacted
Educational Amendments Act of 1976 (adopted by the 1978 Bankruptcy), was
misinformed about actual abuses. The numbers of defaults did not support the
imposition of a showing that the student loan caused an "undue hardship" for the
debtor. The Commission shows how the undue hardship provision has become a
broad rule leading to its virtual inapplicability to protect needy debtors.).
237. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2010) (granting no exceptions unless excepting
such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on
the debtor).
238. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (2010).
239. BAPCPA, supra note 3, at § 203, codified as, 11 U.S.C. §524(k) (2010).
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Reaffirmation agreements also remove the fresh start in terms of
the debt owed on the collateral securing the loan. By reaffirming the
entire obligation, debtors must also reaffirm the unsecured portion of
the debt, requiring debtors to pay in full any shortfall from a
repossession and sale of the collateral. If debtors become unable to
pay on the obligation post-discharge, creditors may seize the
collateral, sell it, apply the proceeds to the outstanding reaffirmed
debt, and then sue debtors for the shortfall. The chapter 7 discharge
will not negatively affect creditors' ability to collect the shortfall from
debtors if their debt relates to a post-petition agreement. Thus, again,
BAPCPA frustrates the spirit of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
Fourth, Section 306 of BAPCPA reduces chapter 13 debtors'
ability to strip-down a secured debt.2 40 Under the 1978 Code, debtors
could bifurcate a secured loan into secured and unsecured portions of,
for example, a car loan.24 1 The chapter 13 plan payment would
include a payment for the secured portion of the debt.242 The
unsecured portion of the obligation was paid in the same manner as
other unsecured debts under the plan. This practice allowed debtors to
pay the actual value of the vehicle rather than the entire purchase
contract amount. BAPCPA eliminates this protection. Now, if
debtors have purchased a car within two and half years of filing a
petition, they must pay the full contract amount through the chapter 13
plan.243 Thus, debtors are further denied the benefit of the fresh start
offered under the 1978 Code.
BAPCPA also limits the discharge given to chapter 13 debtors
upon completion of plan payments by expanding the nondischargeable
provisions of section 1328.244 This section states that certain debts are
no longer dischargeable in a chapter 13 case, such as debts for unfiled,
late-filed, and fraudulent tax returns, 245 credit card misuse,246 and
failure to notify creditors of the bankruptcy in time to allow assertion
240. BAPCPA, supra note 2, codified as 11 U.S.C. §1325 (2010).
241. 11 U.S.C.§ 1325(a)(5) (2010).
242. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
243. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2010).
244. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2010).
245. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2010).
246. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2010).
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of claims.2 47 Further, interest continues to accrue on these debts while
debtors are paying in chapter 13 plans.2 4 8 This eliminates a powerful
debtor tool, the "superdischarge."
BAPCPA is successful at destroying the effectiveness of the fresh
start provisions found in 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which was intended
to protect consumers. The drafters of the 1978 Code appreciated the
allocation of risk and responsibilities in the traditional lending
relationship. A lender/creditor lends money to a borrower/debtor.
The lender charges the borrower interest on the loan to compensate for
the lack of the use of lent funds and for protection if the borrower
defaults. The lender assumes the risk that the borrower may default,
and that is why the lender charges interest. The borrower assumes the
responsibility of repaying the loan with interest as part of the
relationship. The 1978 Code recognized that when a borrower
becomes unable to pay, social and legal mandates ensure protection
against unfair practices.
BAPCPA, on the other hand, purports to protect consumers.
However, as shown above, it protects creditors in the debt relationship
much more than borrowers. BAPCPA functions to reduce lender and
investor risk of default on a loan payment stream by transferring the
entire responsibility of default onto the debtor. The securitization
frenzy of the last thirty years incentivized lenders to increase their
volume of lending because loans (payment streams) were pooled and
sold to investors. The key to reducing lender and investor risk with
securitization is to prevent default and ensure the payment streams.
BAPCPA mandates all kinds of repayment forms. With this
assurance, lenders can sell payment streams at even higher rates
because the risk of debtor default is low and repayment rates are
highly secured.
The process of liberating the financial markets revealed an
opposite visage of the neoliberal machinery for the middle and lower
classes than for the upper classes. In these positions, the neoliberal
state institutions are not so liberating or uplifting. The machinery of
the neoliberal state is castigatory, paternalistic, and restricting when it
comes to managing these populations.
247. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (2010).
248. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10) (2010).
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IV. DOMINANT CULTURAL DISCOURSE 249 OF MORAL BEHAVIORALISM:
STIGMATIZED FISCAL IDENTITIES AND COLLECTIVE AMNESIA
"I pay my debts each month. What is wrong with people?" 250
The statements of former Prime Minister of Great Britain,
Margaret Thatcher, capture the neoliberal vision of a social collective:
"there is no such thing as society, only individual women and men."251
In denying the impact of collective forces found in economic and
political structures, individuals are conveniently held entirely
responsible and accountable for their financial and social positions.252
In this vision of the social world, the individual's fiscal identity, either
as a success or as a failure, is traced directly to the choices and
decisions that he or she "freely" makes in the marketplace. As
discussed elsewhere by the author, Enlightenment notions of
individualism, reason, free will, and progress 253 are the cornerstones
of neoliberalism's model for individual fiscal identity. Under a
neoliberal framework, the individual's experience of debtfare is
therefore solely a result of character and conduct and not a result of
the conduct of lenders and investment bankers.
For individual consumers, debt and financial failure is socially
and culturally mapped by another disciplining discourse: Christian
morality and sin. The individual's decisions and actions in the
marketplace are viewed through this lens,254 such that individual
249. Stuart Hall, Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse, in DISCOURSE
THEORY & PRACTICE: A READER, 72 (Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor &
Simon Yates eds., 2001) (explaining that the meaning of the word "discourse" as
adopted from the Michel Foucault is "a group of statements which provide a
language for talking about-a way of representing the knowledge about-a
particular topic at a particular historical moment).
250. Interview with informant #35 (June 2010) (on file with author).
251. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 23; (citing D. YERGIN & J.
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
AND MARKET PLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1999)).
252. Dag Einar Thorsen, The Neoliberal Challenge: What is Neoliberalism. 2
CONTEMP. READINGS IN L. & Soc. JUST. 188, 204 (2010).
253. Linda Coco, Stigma, Prestige and the Cultural Context of Debt: A
Critical Analysis of the Bankruptcy Judge's Non-Article III Status, 16 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 181 (2011).
254. The Bible informs the notion of financial forgiveness and the bankruptcy
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humans, unlike corporations, are instructed to "remember the sanctity
of their obligations."2 5 5 From this perspective, loan agreements are
moral obligations rather than simply contracts in the "free"
marketplace. Therefore, an individual's failure to perform according
to the terms of the debt agreement becomes an immoral and unethical
act within the network of social relations. The individual, unlike
corporations and banks, is therefore constricted by yet another layer of
social and economic control.
These dominant discourses of personal responsibility and
Christian morality supporting the neoliberal structure succeed in a
powerful process of misrecognition.2 56  Society views individual
debtors as solely responsible for their consequences and status in the
marketplace and social world. Debtors also view themselves through
this same lens. The individual debtor is rarely viewed as part of a
large set of uncontrollable and collective economic and political
practices and processes. This misconception produces a powerful
ethos of meritocratic individualism convenient to the neoliberal state's
policy and practices of deregulation of collective protections.
The common belief is that wage earners who become unemployed
are responsible for their own fates. Neoliberal theory holds that
unemployment is always voluntary.257 Persons experiencing
burdensome debt are accused of making poor financial decisions.
Owners of homes that are over-secured and under water are judged for
reaching beyond any actual ability to pay. Those casting judgment do
not consider that the number of decent-paying jobs has decreased,
interest rates on revolving credit have sky-rocketed, and Wall Street's
mortgage bubble has artificially driven up prices of single-family
homes. They also fail to consider that consumers often must turn to
unsecured credit in the wake of family illness or job loss when there is
a lack of other social support systems.
The dominant discourses create a normalization of social
insecurity by employing notions of disconnected individual
discharge; it provided the 1978 Bankruptcy Code's seven-year time span between
discharges of debt, and the Bible provides a model for the relationship between the
creditor and debtor. Deuteronomy 24:6:15.8iii.
255. BRUCE MANN, THE REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 262 (2002).
256. BOURDIEU, supra note 1, at 164.
257. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 53.
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responsibility and personal shame. 25 8 These discourses generate a
social and economic paradox and set a trap for the middle class
population. As the welfare state is cut back, "larger and larger
segments of the population [are] exposed to impoverishment" and as
such, "the social safety net is reduced to a bare minimum in favor of a
system that emphasizes individual personal responsibility... [and] the
victim is all too often blamed."259
In Debt for Sale: A Social History of the Credit Trap,
anthropologist Brett Williams questions the naturalization of this
model of fiscal identity. She asks, "In the face of this rude
exploitation [i.e., employment insecurity, marketing and advertising of
the culture of consumerism in every part of social life, the rising costs
of education and healthcare, and the organized credit industry-target
marketing, easy credit, and increasing opportunities to use credit in
daily life] why aren't we angry at banks? Why instead do we blame
debtors?" 260
VI. CONCLUSION-TIGHTENING THE BELTS OF THE POOR AS THE BELTS
OF THE RICH ARE LOOSENED.
"Who really owes what to whom?" 261
"Many years ago my father asked his children in a dinner-table
conversation, 'Why will capitalism always survive?' His answer:
'because socialism will always be used to save it.'"262
During the 2008 economic crisis, public money was used as a
cash infusion for private investment entities. These private entities
were considered "too big to fail." The year following the infusion of
public money, several of these entities lodged record profits and
bonuses for their executives and employees. Their reckless behavior
was rewarded. No government unit or bankruptcy court imposed a
plan of austerity on these institutions. BAPCPA's allowances limiting
258. WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 51, at 204.
259. HARVEY, NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 54, at 53.
260. BRETT WILLIAMS, DEBT FOR SALE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE CREDIT
TRAP, 51 (2004).
261. GRAEBER, supra note 1, at 13.
262. Ralph Nader, King George & Comrade Paulson, THE NATION, Oct. 13,
2008, at 6.
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debtor expenses and requiring repayment under "bread and water"
chapter 13 plans only apply to "individuals with primarily consumer
debts," not large investment firms. The reckless gambling behaviors
of these firms, which tanked the entire economy, remain unchecked.
The creators of the conditions making the failure of the middle class
possible were rewarded.
Middle class Americans now face a lifetime of repayment.2 6 3 The
extensive protections of the 1978 Code are limited and the purpose of
the Code frustrated. What neoliberal models fail to recognize is that
the health of this country's economy has always depended on the free
flow of money. Money must move to generate wealth. As the largest
segment of the population, the middle class has traditionally been the
engine driving the economy with its purchasing power. While
servicing debtfare, the middle class is precluded from the wealth
creation process. The cumulative debt load or crushing debt overhang
from the interlocking debt structures will absorb the future incomes of
consumers and prevent them from engaging in the economy. This will
detract from economic growth. Future income used to pay old debts
means less money circulating in the economy. Debtfare truncates the
flow of money, the lifeblood of capitalism, and slows the velocity of
capital. Thus, it has become apparent that the vision of the drafters of
BAPCPA was focused on short-term debt collection, rather than long-
term economic health.
An anthropological lens is wide angled. It draws together
disparate and seemingly unconnected social and cultural phenomena
to reveal larger trends in collective experience. All the indicators in
such an analysis signal a dramatic shift in the power and class
structures in the U.S. This shift is manifesting in the very basic social
relationship between individuals who occupy distinct positions of
power: lender (holder of capital) and borrower (in need of capital). As
anthropologist David Greaber explains in his recent text entitled Debt:
The First 5,000 Years, the debt relationship is and has been absolutely
fundamental to the structure of all human societies. However, under
BAPCPA, the risks and responsibilities traditionally shared by the
263. See, e.g., The Debt Trap: A Series About the Surge in Consumer Debt and
the Lenders that Made it Possible, N.Y. TIMES. (explaining that millions of
Americans are deep in debt, and that they now face a lifetime of repayment),
available at http://topics.nytimes.con/topics/news/business/series/the debt trap
/index.html.
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lender and borrower in the debt relationship are now transferred solely
onto the shoulders of the borrower.
Using the notions found in the dominant discourse of moral
behavioralism, this shift appears natural, inevitable, and just.
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